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ABSTRACT 
Dale Nicholas Koch: Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration  
Using Socioeconomic and Cultural Theoretical Modeling 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
 
Two substantial and growing bodies of literature address variations in individual attitudes 
toward immigration from a socioeconomic and a cultural perspective, respectively. Fewer 
studies, however, seek to reconcile these theoretical perspectives through a more holistic 
approach. With that in mind, this paper is conceived with an appreciation for explaining 
immigration attitude formation as a complex web of deeply interconnected factors which vary 
widely in importance among individuals. I argue that, in addition to socioeconomic factors, 
cultural elements play an even stronger role in the formation of public opinion toward 
immigration on an individual level. In particular, I use quantitative analysis of European Social 
Survey (2014) data to separate the effects of prejudicial views from the effects of cultural fears 
which are responsible for a substantial amount of opposition to immigration in Europe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration policy has been a divisive and high-profile issue in several recent national 
elections and referendums in Europe and North America. In addition to the United Kingdom’s 
referendum to leave the European Union, the latest national elections in the United States, the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, and Austria were largely defined by immigration. Many 
countries remain divided on this issue: election results are often close, and outcomes across 
countries have favored pro- and anti-immigration political parties. Public opinion survey data 
reveal that support for or opposition to immigration varies not just among individuals, but also 
widely across countries (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Opposition to Immigration by Country 
This raises two questions central to the issue of public opinion about immigration. How 
can we explain differences in attitudes toward immigration not only among individuals, and what 
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explains variation across countries? There is a large body of literature exploring these questions, 
from which two general theoretical perspectives emerge. One approach seeks to explain 
differences in attitudes toward immigration by examining socioeconomic factors driving 
citizens’ opinions (Artiles and Meardi 2014; Citrin et al. 1997; Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, 
and Álvarez-Gálvez 2015; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). This approach cites economic concerns 
among native citizens as a driver of anti-immigrant sentiment. Two prominent theoretical models 
commonly comprise this socioeconomic explanation. The labor market competition model 
theorizes that native citizens will be more opposed to immigrants with a similar skill level to 
their own. In their US study, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) claim to disprove this model, 
finding that both high-skilled and low-skilled workers prefer high-skilled immigrants to those 
considered to be low-skilled. To add an extra wrinkle to the labor market perspective, US survey 
data suggests that many individuals believe that new immigration depresses domestic wages 
(Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Alternatively, the fiscal burden model predicts that it is not fear of 
labor market competition but the fear of strain on public services caused by immigrant inflows 
which drives greater opposition to low-skill immigrants. This model predicts greater opposition 
to low-skill immigrants than high-skill immigrants by wealthy natives – who fear a higher tax 
burden to finance public services – and poor natives – who are concerned that low-skill 
immigrants will reduce the availability of benefits and services – alike. Yet again, Hainmueller 
and Hiscox (2010) present findings which suggest that both wealthy and poor natives prefer 
high-skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants. 
Another theoretical angle taken by researchers to explain differing attitudes toward 
immigration looks to cultural factors (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000; Burns and 
Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997). Bauer et al. (2000) propose that public attitudes are shaped by 
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the so-called ‘quality’ of immigrants according to similarities between immigrants’ country of 
origin and the receiving country, particularly with regards to economic development, education 
system, language, and culture. Citrin et al. (1997) find significant links between an individual’s 
personal ideology and affective orientation toward particular ethnic groups and their attitudes 
toward immigration. Burns and Gimpel (2000) argue that discourse claiming economic reasons 
for opposition to immigration is often underpinned by prejudicial views toward certain 
ethnicities. Another important aspect of the cultural dimension is the concept of natives’ fear of 
cultural loss reflected by increasing political tension related to globalization and 
denationalization (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Hutter and Kriesi 2017; Kriesi et al. 2006). 
Are these two broad theoretical perspectives – that attitudes toward immigration can be 
best explained by socioeconomic factors or by cultural factors – incompatible with one another, 
or do they perhaps complement each other to paint a more complete picture of the factors which 
affect public opinion toward immigration and which drive anti-immigrant sentiment? In the next 
section of this paper, I will conduct a review of prominent literature from each of the two main 
perspectives and summarize the distinct key insights of each. In section three, I will critique the 
strengths and weaknesses of each competing body of theory and bring together the key insights 
they offer about variation in attitudes toward immigration when considered together. In section 
four, I identify and explain key variables and offer my own quantitative analysis of attitudes 
toward immigration using European Social Survey public opinion data. In section five, I 
conclude by summarizing the most important points of the paper and lay out my hypothesis that 
neither theoretical approach is flexible enough on its own to adequately explain why individuals 
form certain attitudes about immigration, and that both approaches must be considered together 
in order to reach a more useful predictive capability.  
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2. MAIN THEORIES 
2.1 Socioeconomic Theories 
There is a large body of work which argues that individual preferences for immigration 
policy can be largely explained by socioeconomic factors. One theoretical approach, the labor 
market competition model, examines the link between immigration and the effect natives expect 
immigration to have on competition for jobs and on the level of wages (Mayda 2006; Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001). Under this model, natives’ immigration preferences vary across two 
dimensions: the skill level of natives and the skill level of potential immigrants. A second model, 
the fiscal burden model, frames the issue instead in terms of competition for and contribution to 
public benefits and services. Unlike the LMC model, the fiscal burden model is concerned with 
just one key dimension: this body of research finds that there is greater support for high-skilled 
immigrants than low-skilled immigrants regardless of natives’ skill level (Artiles and Meardi 
2014; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, and Álvarez-Gálvez 2015). 
Below, I explain each of the two models, laying out their underlying economic mechanisms and 
examining the subsequent predictions of each.  
The Labor Market Competition Model 
The labor market competition model predicts that individuals’ preferences on 
immigration are primarily driven by fears about the impact of new immigration on the labor 
market and wages. In principle, this model conceives of labor markets as national in scope rather 
than as having any regional or local factor constraints, as conceived by the Heckscher-Ohlin 
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Model of trade and the factor-proportions analysis model. It assumes that labor is mobile and 
that the market produces multiple tradable outputs, allowing economies to leverage trade theories 
such as competitive advantage (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). It also assumes that demand for 
labor is essentially fixed or unaffected by immigration, and so the number of available jobs is 
finite. The results are modeled in Figure 2: influx of new immigrants into the labor market will 
shift the labor supply curve outward while the labor demand curve remains unchanged. Instead, 
new immigrant workers accept wages (Wi) below market value (We) while the overall quantity of 
jobs (Q) stays the same. The shaded triangle thus represents deadweight loss, or a market 
inefficiency resulting from disequilibrium.  
 
Figure 2: Labor Market Model 
The model correctly conceives of labor not as a single market, but as segmented into 
multiple markets. Under the labor market competition model, labor is differentiated according to 
skill-level: natives are classified as either “high-skill” or “low-skill” labor market participants. 
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According to an individual’s skill-level, the model views individuals as operating in one of two 
general and distinct labor markets. Inflows of low-skill immigrants are therefore expected to only 
increase competition for low-skill jobs and suppress wages of low-skill workers and high-skill 
immigrants will lower wages only in the high-skill labor market. This model also assumes that 
skilled and unskilled labor markets are complementary, meaning that an increase in the supply of 
unskilled labor reduces the relative supply of skilled labor, thus raising skilled wages, and vice-
versa (Mayda 2006). 
Whether the model represented by Figure 2 correctly explains the effect of immigration 
on the labor market – some research argues that it does not (Card 2001; Ottaviano and Peri 2008) 
– is not so consequential as whether natives perceive it to be so. According to the labor market 
competition model, the perception of this labor market mechanism by natives explaining the 
impact of immigration on labor market competition and wages results in a particular set of policy 
preferences. The model expects natives to form preferences along the skill-level dimension: 
preferences among low-skill and high-skill natives will be distinct from one another because they 
are shaped by different expectations about how labor market and wage-setting mechanisms will 
affect them individually. Under this model, low-skill natives will be more likely to oppose new 
immigration of low-skill immigrants than of high-skill immigrants, and high-skill natives will 
have softer views, on average, toward low-skill immigration. 
Immediately, some potential issues with this model come to mind. First, the model 
assumes a sufficient degree of mobility of labor. Markets under this model are assumed to be 
nationally-defined rather than locally segmented. In terms of labor markets, this means that low 
or no barriers exist which would prevent workers from relocating for a job. One can think of a 
number of reasons why this assumption may be unrealistic, however, particularly for arriving 
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immigrants. While no legal barriers exist to prevent the mobility of workers in the United States 
or among most European countries, moving costs, community attachments, lack of community 
or family support, and access to information about economic opportunities in other areas all 
represent potential technical barriers for both native and immigrant workers that restrict mobility, 
particularly for low-income workers. Additionally, the labor market competition model only 
maintains its explanatory ability as long as native workers perceive wage suppression or higher 
labor market competition and as long as no other economic or noneconomic factors significantly 
influence individuals’ attitudes. Put another way, the model is only valid if personal economic 
self-interest, specifically based in concerns over employment and income security, is the primary 
driver of attitude formation.  
Several studies question or challenge the predictions of the labor market competition 
model (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010). Analysis of survey 
responses in both the United States and in Europe show that natives prefer highly skilled 
immigrants to low-skilled immigrants regardless of their own skill level (more on this in section 
4). There is also debate as to whether the underlying effects of immigration on the labor market 
assumed by the labor market competition model are correct. While the labor market model 
incorporates a shift in labor supply resulting from immigrant inflows, it must assume that the 
demand for labor is held constant or experiences only a negligible increase in order to reach the 
conclusion that wages will be subsequently suppressed. This seems unlikely however, since 
newly arriving immigrants add new consumers as well as job-seekers to the economy, and 
therefore raise aggregate demand in the country of arrival (to what degree depends on the 
earning capacity of the arriving immigrants). In turn, we would expect the demand for labor 
subsequently to rise. Indeed, findings about the real impact of immigration on income are mixed. 
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Some research does find that immigration negatively impacts natives’ earnings (Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz 1996), however other evidence suggests that immigration has an insignificant 
(Card 2001) or even a positive effect on wages (Ottaviano and Peri 2008). 
The Fiscal Burden Model 
A second model under the socioeconomic branch of theory is the fiscal burden model. 
Like the labor force competition model, the fiscal burden model is based on the assumption that 
certain natives may view new immigration negatively because they perceive it as increasing 
competition for limited resources. However, unlike the labor force competition model, which 
frames the issue of scarcity around jobs and wages, the key resources under the fiscal burden 
model are those related to the welfare state. The fiscal burden model predicts that natives 
formulate attitudes about immigration based on the fear that immigration will place increased 
stress on the public goods and services of the welfare state and affect either the allocation of 
limited social benefits or the tax burden associated with expanding the user base of benefits.  
Facchini and Mayda (2009) model a pair of mechanisms that welfare states may use to 
adjust to expansions in the number of beneficiaries. In the tax adjustment model, the state sets 
out to maintain social benefits per capita. A state does so by increasing taxes and welfare state 
spending to prevent a drop-off in the amount or availability of individual benefits. The result of 
this model of state adjustment is an increased tax burden primarily for higher earners or, most 
often, high-skill workers. In the benefit adjustment model, the state instead maintains existing 
levels of spending and taxation while the pool of beneficiaries grows, effectively reducing the 
size of the welfare state relative by reducing public services and benefits per capita. Under this 
model, low-skill workers tend to bear the burden of welfare state adjustment as they are forced to 
accept fewer benefits and services than they were previously adapted to. There remains some 
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debate about which model more accurately reflects states’ behavior. Mayda (2006) finds 
evidence that governments tend to engage with the tax adjustment strategy, seeking to maintain 
the individual level of benefits. However Jaime-Castillo et al. (2015) argue that states are more 
likely to adhere to the benefit adjustment model, allowing individual benefits to drop without 
making major adjustments to overall spending. This is particularly true in a climate of fiscal 
austerity. 
Like the labor force participation model, the fiscal burden model differentiates 
individuals by socioeconomic status, either high-skill or low-skill.1 Individual attitudes toward 
immigration are thus explained by natives’ perception that the arrival of low-skill immigrants 
and their subsequent inclusion into the welfare state will result either in a reduction of per capita 
social transfers by holding taxes constant or an increase in taxes in order to maintain existing per 
capita benefits (Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). For high-skill natives, 
low-skill immigrants represent a greater tax burden if they are incorporated into the welfare state. 
Low-skill natives are more likely to oppose low-skill immigrants out of fear that they will 
compete for limited public resources, resulting in a lower share of benefits per capita. Based on 
this relationship, the theory predicts that all natives, regardless of skill level, will hold greater 
opposition to low-skill immigrants than to high-skill immigrants. 
There are some notable shortcomings of the fiscal burden model and the common 
methodology for testing it which warrant discussion. First, the effect of immigration is likely to 
be higher in countries with more generous welfare states, as well as those which are more 
inclusive to non-national residents. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain a comprehensive 
                                                        
1 Both income and education are sometimes used as proxy variables for skill level, so it should 
be noted that these variables correlate positively with one another and are considered to be 
somewhat interchangeable in these models. 
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calculation of a state’s fiscal exposure to immigration since it may not be possible to accurately 
measure the use of many public services by immigrants such as public roads and transportation, 
public safety and emergency services, parks, and education (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). 
Certainly, evidence suggests that characteristics of the welfare state have an impact on 
differences in attitudes toward immigration. Jaime-Castillo et al. (2015) argue, for instance, that 
the size of the welfare state can explain differences in attitudes between low and high 
socioeconomic status individuals, finding that the impact is greater in countries with greater 
social expenditure. To explain this observation, the authors suggest that since low-income 
individuals in generous welfare states are more likely to be affected by a decrease in per capita 
social benefits, and because there are likely to be a greater number of individuals who are 
dependent on the welfare state, the negative impact of immigration on natives’ attitudes toward 
immigration policy will be more severe in countries with more generous welfare states. 
Reflexively, they find that the impact of immigration is less potent on native attitudes in 
countries with less generous and/or more restrictive welfare states. But evidence also suggests 
that countries with higher inequality are also more likely to see more opposition to immigration. 
This is something of a paradox since we would expect inequality to correlate negatively with the 
size of the welfare state. One explanation for these seemingly contrary findings may be that 
countries with higher social expenditure also tend to focus on social inclusion of immigrants, 
thereby reducing anti-immigrant sentiment (Artiles and Meardi 2014). This suggests that perhaps 
it is not so much the size of the welfare state as its quality which helps to explain differences in 
attitudes toward immigration across countries. Welfare regime theory allows us to consider 
welfare states by type rather than simply by overall expenditure (Esping-Andersen 1990), 
offering an attractive testable dimension to incorporate into the quantitative portion of this study. 
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As a final criticism, in addition to the aforementioned theoretical issues with the fiscal burden 
model, one can speculate that there will be substantial differences across countries in the actual 
impact of immigration on the welfare state based on variations in the restrictiveness to entry to 
the welfare systems of different countries. 
2.2 Cultural Theories 
While there are clearly opposing theories about the role of economic variables in 
immigration attitude formation, a great deal of literature seeks to address noneconomic factors 
involved in shaping attitudes toward immigration. Certainly, the economic arguments should not 
be ignored, as they show that economic factors can account at least for some of the variation in 
individual attitude formation. However, given the often emotional and deeply personal nature of 
individual views on immigration policy, these explanations clearly cannot tell the whole story. 
To understand the aspects of attitude formation that economic approaches miss, I look to social 
and cultural factors. Given evidence of a strong link between ideology and affective orientations 
toward particular racial or ethnic groups and individual preferences about immigration (Citrin et 
al. 1997), I introduce two lines of inquiry. 
The first, the role of stereotyping and prejudice, is perhaps the most obvious. This 
argument positions opposition to immigration as an expression of somewhat fixed attitudes based 
on individuals’ underlying prejudices toward other groups. The second highlights the notion of 
cultural loss which may stem from immigration. Where discussions of individual immigration 
attitudes based on economic factors often frame the debate in terms of economic policies 
generating economic winners and losers (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 2000), we can also 
think of immigration policy in terms of generating cultural winners and losers based on the way a 
country’s culture changes in response to an influx of new immigrants with different cultures.  
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Stereotyping and Prejudice 
Most of the literature on immigration operates under the assumption that individuals in 
the native population view all immigrants in a uniform way (Bridges and Mateut 2014), however 
it may be immediately apparent to the casual observer that this is unlikely. All individuals, to 
varying degrees, interrelate with other individuals through their own personal complex lens of 
pre-formulated stereotypes. These stereotypes condition the way we take in information and 
formulate decisions and judgements about others (Burns and Gimpel 2000).  
Racial and ethnic stereotypes are not inherently negative by nature, and some stereotypes 
can be benign. However, the theoretical linkage between stereotyping, prejudicial attitudes, and 
opinions about immigration is closely related to the debate over immigration attitude formation. 
It is common that we ascribe group identities to others and relate other individuals to our 
personal stereotypical notions about the ascribed group. Stereotyping is a useful and expedient 
tool all people use in this way, often unconsciously, to more easily interpret other people through 
generalizations of learned perceptions about groups’ characteristics and assigning those 
characteristics to the group’s members as symbolic labels. Often, and perhaps most prominently, 
stereotypes are assigned to groups on the grounds of racial or ethnic identity. It is important to 
note however that prejudicial attitude formation does not necessarily follow from stereotyping; 
the content of stereotypes determines whether they will result in prejudiced views (Burns and 
Gimpel 2000).  
A strong link has been found between race/ethnicity and negative stereotyping. U.S. 
survey data has revealed that individuals, on average, rank other ethnic groups as “more lazy” or 
“less intelligent” than their own group, and individuals who are economically pessimistic were 
even more likely to hold negative stereotypes (Burns and Gimpel 2000) . Race seems to play a 
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significant role in individual preferences about immigration in Europe as well. Among those 
polled by the 2014/15 European Social Survey, 17% said that some racial or ethnic groups were 
born less intelligent than others and close to 38% said that some groups were born harder 
working than others (Table 1). Another round of the ESS revealed that, although 47% of 
respondents (in 2002) preferred to limit the arrival of immigrants, only 32% said they want to 
limit the arrival of immigrants of the same race as compared with 45% who said they want to 
limit the arrival of immigrants of different races.2 This seems to suggest a potential racial bias. 
Although some European countries favored the restriction of immigration (Greece) more than 
others (Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland), opposition to the arrival of immigrants of different races 
was more likely than opposition to the arrival of immigrants of the same race across countries, 
even in the more pro-immigration countries (Bridges and Mateut 2014).  
Table 1: Racial Bias (Source: European Social Survey 2014/15) 
 
                                                        
2 Data collected by Bridges and Mateut (2014). 
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Cultural Loss 
Fear over cultural loss in response to immigration has been an issue of growing salience 
for several decades. The rise of globalism has resulted in new groups of winners and losers of 
policies where borders are more open than ever to trade and immigration. Some scholars have 
conceptualized this division as a redefinition of existing political dimensions which helps to 
explain shifting individual preferences as a transformation of national electorates (Hutter and 
Kriesi 2017; Kriesi et al. 2006). Others have demonstrated, in the context of European 
integration, the emergence of a new political cleavage. This GAL 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian) – TAN (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalism) dimension 
broadly a spectrum of Euroskepticism or Europeanism along which new political parties are 
emerging and existing parties attempt to realign (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002).  
Whether thought of as a rearrangement of old political dimensions or a new dimension 
altogether, the supply-side response by parties signals the importance of this growing divide 
among the electorate. This alone, however, does not speak to the underlying causes for 
individual support for or opposition to integration. Kriesi et al. (2006) frame the dynamics 
surrounding globalism another way, conceiving of political contestation as operating along two 
fundamental dimensions: social-economic and cultural. Rather than understanding integration 
politics as the emergence of a new cleavage, they argue that social movements have transformed 
the meanings of these existing political dimensions. Specifically, two social movements are 
identified which helped to redefine the political field in Europe: ‘The New Left’, which came 
about in the 1970s, and ‘The New Right’, which began with the Front National in France in the 
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1980s. Although each wave was built on a collection of changes to economic, political, and 
cultural factors, each wave is chiefly concerned with cultural issues (Hutter and Kriesi 2017). 
Viewed this way, the cultural dimension of political contestation can be characterized as 
a conflict between cultural-protectionist and cosmopolitan perspectives. Due to the economic 
heterogeneity of ‘losers’ of globalization (Kriesi et al. 2006), who we might expect to hold anti-
immigration sentiments, this dimension is integral to describing opponents of immigration 
insofar as opponents’ attitude formation is associated with individual conceptions of ‘national 
identity’ (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007) and with a protectionist response based on fear of 
cultural loss. On the other pole, it should be similarly possible to identify a coalition of culturally 
tolerant natives who support immigration. Individuals in this group either do not fear cultural 
loss or they embrace cultural intermixing that immigration may bring, else cultural loss is simply 
a low-salience issue compared to other factors (for instance, as compared to potential economic 
gains). 
These studies demonstrate that fear of cultural loss and opposition to immigration have 
become ideologically linked. This linkage is supported using ESS data: feelings about 
immigration clearly track positively with feelings about the effect of immigration on cultural life 
(see Appendix A). Data from the ESS can also provide some insight about beliefs which may 
underpin this ideology. Figure 3 shows that, for several key identity characteristics – language, 
religion, race, and commitment to a native way of life – people who responded that it is 
important for immigrants to be similar to themselves were more likely to oppose immigration 
than those who did not think it was important. As several authors point out, education likely has 
a strong association with support for immigration: more educated individuals have been found to 
hold significantly less racially and ethnically prejudicial views, value cultural diversity more 
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highly, and are more likely to believe that immigration benefits the overall national economy 
(Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). There are two suggested reasons for this: 
First, education exposes people to ideas about tolerance and embracing diversity, helping them to 
learn about and appreciate other cultures (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Second, higher 
education opens the door to greater employment opportunities which are more likely to insulate 
people from economic hardships such like unemployment or labor market competition resulting 
from more immigration. 
 
Figure 3: Opposition to Immigration by Cultural Factors 
2.3 Alternative explanations 
Economic and cultural variables occupy a substantial amount of bandwidth in the debate 
over which factors influence individuals’ attitudes toward immigration, however there are other 
explanations worthy of mention which are neither explicitly economic or cultural in nature. 
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Specifically, I wish to present two factors which are likely to account for a significant amount of 
variation in views toward immigration among natives.  
One important alternative factor pertains to where natives live in relation to non-natives 
and people of other racial or ethnic groups. Natives’ proximity to immigrants is usually 
measured as the proportion of natives to non-natives in an area population, but it is also 
approached through survey questions which ask natives about their perceived ethnic composition 
of their neighborhood and about their social relationships and casual contact with people from 
other racial or ethnic groups in their daily lives. The impact of living in proximity to and having 
regular contact with non-native people is contested among scholars is contested, suggesting that 
the impact of proximity is somewhat contextual. Burns and Gimpel (2000), for example, find a 
weak link between residential integration and opposition to immigration. Surprisingly though, 
they found in their study of individuals in the U.S. that living in close proximity to ethnically 
dissimilar individuals increased negative racial stereotyping and made natives more likely to 
oppose immigration, although they stress that the link was not significant. Using European 
survey results, Bridges and Mateut (2014) discover the opposite effect: in European countries 
with higher proportions of non-native immigrants in the population, respondents were less likely 
to oppose the arrival of new immigrants who are of a different ethnicity. Natives’ exposure to 
immigrants did not have much impact on their opposition to the arrival of immigrants of the 
same ethnicity, however. 
The second alternative factor which must be mentioned is the effect of political cueing by 
far-right parties. One noted effect of European integration among some individuals who identify 
most closely with a national identity has been a sense of identity loss (Hooghe and Marks 2005) 
– something that radical TAN parties seize upon (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Hutter and 
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Kriesi 2017). Promotion of national identity has been demonstrated to increase anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), suggesting that political cueing has the 
potential for powerful influence on issues surrounding immigration. One can therefore surmise 
that the presence of nationalist right-wing or radical TAN parties in a country would influence 
difference among individuals’ preferences toward immigration, perhaps even confounding the 
effects of the proximity variable. 
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3. CORE INSIGHTS OF THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
A review of the literature reveals a broad and complex web of contextual factors which 
influence attitudes toward immigration. Each theoretical model offers particular strengths for 
explaining why immigration preferences vary, but each also has certain weaknesses either in 
their inability to explain attitudes beyond a limited scope of countries and time (Bauer, Lofstrom, 
and Zimmermann 2000; Citrin et al. 1997) or by predicating their arguments upon unrealistic 
assumptions which simply do not hold up in the real world (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). 
3.1 Primary criticisms of the theories 
Many of the variables used across studies present obvious issues of collinearity which 
obfuscate the apparent presence and direction of causation. Most studies employ income or 
education as a proxy variable for measuring skill level (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann 
2000; Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, and Álvarez-Gálvez 2015; Mayda 2006; Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001) or note that similar results are obtained when substituting education for a more 
direct measure of skill level (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007) in relation to immigration 
preferences. Collinearity among income, education, and skill level, one might guess, is likely to 
be very high. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) caution us to challenge the framing of educational 
attainment as a chiefly economic factor. Instead, they ask whether education might be more 
accurately interpreted from the perspective that more education leads to more cosmopolitan 
attitudes, valuing diversity and practicing more ethnic and racial tolerance. Their own findings 
suggest that people with higher education are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the 
immigrants’ ethnicity of country of origin, countering other studies which found that 
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immigrants’ country of origin causes significant variation in natives’ attitudes toward 
immigration (Bridges and Mateut 2014). Their results support theories about the salience of 
racial and ethnic prejudice in shaping attitudes toward immigration (Bridges and Mateut 2014; 
Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997).  
Examinations across studies of the relationship between natives’ exposure to immigrants 
or members of other racial or ethnic groups and attitudes toward immigration also raise 
questions. It has been demonstrated in Europe that natives who have greater exposure to 
immigrants are less likely to oppose the arrival of new immigrants of different racial or ethnic 
backgrounds (Bridges and Mateut 2014). However, a similar study in the US revealed that 
residential integration of different ethnic groups has also been shown to increase rather than 
decrease hostility and breed more negative stereotyping, leading to increased prejudicial views 
(Burns and Gimpel 2000) and resulting in a greater likelihood of opposition to immigration. 
From these contrasting findings, it would appear that variations in geographical and historical 
contexts, the composition and distribution of immigrant populations (Bridges and Mateut 2014), 
and the socioeconomic qualities of the native population make it difficult to reliably compare the 
effects of natives’ exposure to immigrants across countries. 
A second broad criticism that can be leveled on immigration attitudes research in the 
United States and Europe addresses the direction of causation of the hypothesized relationships. 
Although the available research tests a variety of different dependent variables across studies, all 
rely on cross-sectional, but not panel, opinion survey data.3 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) point 
out that relying on difference-in-difference experiment design rather than using multi-year panel 
                                                        
3 Most European studies utilize data from the European Social Survey; American studies cited in 
this paper use the American National Election Studies survey. Neither survey provides panel data 
across years. 
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data weakens the direction of causation arguments in the literature. Since the usefulness of the 
study of attitudes toward immigration hinges on the ability of the theoretical models to explain 
actionable factors which significantly influence opposition to immigration, the salience of this 
point cannot be understated. Serious caution should be exercised assigning causation to any 
factor in explaining immigration attitudes given the complex web of corollary factors at play 
which shift in proportionality across countries and time. 
3.2 Reconciling the existing theoretical frameworks 
Realistically, opposition to immigration is likely a highly personal, tailored attitude based 
on a complex mixture of causal factors whose significance vary in proportionality among 
individuals. We can easily imagine both an individual who forms their preferences about 
immigration based on primarily on concerns for personal or national economic wellbeing as well 
as one whose attitudes are founded mainly on cultural factors or prejudice. Collectively, the body 
of literature on immigration attitude formation does not give adequate cause to label either type 
of individual a clear anomaly, or even necessarily a minority, among national populations. In 
reality, accepting a flexible blend of explanatory factors would appear to be the most beneficial 
course of study from a real-world application perspective. Burns and Gimpel (2000) submit that 
“According to one tradition of scholarship, prejudice is ultimately an expression of self-
interested calculations based on one's economic position; and anti-immigrant attitudes are 
traceable to economic anxieties.” As above, we might also imagine a dynamic wherein attitudes 
toward immigration appear to be explained by stated economic anxieties which are, in reality, ex 
post facto rationalizations for underlying prejudice which had always been present but remained 
unexpressed until economic justifications became available. Perhaps, too, anxiety over fear of 
cultural loss is sometimes more palatable when expressed as economic fears. In any of these 
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cases, it would come as no surprise if some of these latent factors should be obscured in survey 
data. As developmental psychologist Jonathan Haidt observes, adults sometimes fabricate moral 
reasoning post hoc, in effect constructing a rational justification to support irrational emotional 
views or actions after the fact (Haidt 2012). If it is possible that some respondents who hold 
attitudes toward immigration based on prejudicial views or fears of cultural change are either 
unwilling to admit it when surveyed or are not consciously aware that their preferences are based 
on cultural anxieties rather than objective economic concerns, then it would be more practical, if 
it is possible, to perceive attitudes toward immigration as resulting from a mesh of economic and 
cultural factors. 
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4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In this section, I will outline and test the relationships between attitudes toward 
immigration and several related variables which I identify based on the literature I have reviewed 
above. Rather than attempt to develop a sophisticated unifying model to predict attitude 
formation, I will present several simple models for both individual- and national-level units of 
analysis. Data presented below is from round 7 of the European Social Survey (2014) which 
draws a sample from tens of thousands of respondents4 across European countries5. 
4.1 Key Variables 
Attitude Toward Immigration 
To measure the dependent variable in this analysis, attitude toward immigration, I use 
respondents’ answer to the question, “is your country made a worse or a better place to live by 
people coming to live here from other countries?" Responses to this question are recorded as 
thermometer data, where 0 represents “worse” and 10 represents “better.” There are three 
advantages to this method for measuring attitude toward immigration. First, while many 
researchers who use this data for similar studies measure this variable based on respondents’ 
agreement with the statement, “immigration good or bad for country’s economy,” that measure is 
perhaps better suited to arguments based on economic factors. The measurement I use is more 
                                                        
4 N = 40,185 
 
5 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
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appropriate for an analysis aimed at understanding both economic and cultural factors. Second, 
thermometer data provides more resolution into understanding individual’s views on 
immigration than a simple dichotomous (“support” or “oppose”) variable. Third, this 
measurement reduces bias by asking about preferences indirectly by referring to respondents’ 
home country rather than addressing their personal likes or dislikes directly. 
Racial or Ethnic Prejudice 
The first key independent variable, and the first cultural variable I will test, is racial or 
ethnic Prejudice. To detect prejudice, I use two questions from the European Social Survey: “Do 
you think some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others?” and “Do you think 
some races or ethnic groups are born harder working than others?” Respondents who indicated 
prejudicial views by answering “yes” to either or both of these questions were coded 1 while 
only those who responded negatively to both questions were coded 0. The reasoning behind this 
methodology is relatively straightforward. The variable prejudice is intended to capture racial or 
ethnic stereotyping by identifying those individuals who believe that certain groups of people are 
intrinsically different in terms of capability or ethic on a racial or ethnic basis. It is not intended 
to quantify racial or ethnic prejudice. Rather, it is merely meant to mark the presence of 
prejudicial thinking through negative stereotyping by respondents about people of other races or 
ethnicities. Therefore, the threshold to indicate prejudice was set intentionally low: any 
indication of negative stereotyping is considered equal by this analysis. 
The positive association between prejudice and opposition to immigration can be gleaned 
from Figure 4. Individuals who indicate racial or ethnic prejudice opposed immigration at a 
higher rate than those who did not indicate prejudice, as expected. This effect persists across skill 
levels as well, with roughly 15% more respondents opposing immigration when they indicated 
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racial or ethnic prejudice in both skill groups, although overall opposition to immigration was 
lower among high-skill workers. 
 
Figure 4: Opposition to Immigration by Native Prejudice and Skill Level 
Fear of Cultural Loss 
The next two key independent variables I will test are also on the cultural dimension, 
each intended to measure cultural loss. The first variable (Cultural Life) measures responses to 
the question, “Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by 
people coming to live here from other countries?” on a thermometer scale from 0 (“Cultural life 
undermined”) to 10 (“Cultural life enriched”). The advantage to this variable is that it directly 
measures individuals’ fear of cultural loss as a result of immigration. An array of similar 
variables provided by the ESS, for instance, which ask “How important should it be for someone 
born, brought up, and living outside [country] to speak the country’s official language for them 
to be able to come and live here?” measure something slightly different. These variables measure 
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particular variations on opposition to immigration, which are proximate to the dependent 
variable, rather than fear of cultural loss itself. 
A second independent variable on the cultural dimension, which carries many of the same 
advantages as the previously discussed variable, measures responses to the question, “It is better 
for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions?” Responses to this 
variable (Share Customs) are given on a scale from 1 (“Agree strongly”) to 5 (“Disagree 
strongly”). Both cultural loss variables track positively with attitude toward immigration.  
Perception of Immigrant Competition 
Another primary independent variable, and one of two key socio-economic variables I 
will test, is respondent’s perception of the extent to which immigration increases competition in 
the labor market. This variable (Take Jobs?) is based on answers to the question “Would you say 
that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [your country], or 
generally help to create new jobs?” Respondents answered on a thermometer scale where 0 is 
“Take away jobs” and 10 is “Create new jobs.” In order to capture the sentiment that 
immigration increases labor market competition, I have coded Take Jobs? as a dummy variable 
where 1 represents original responses from 0 to 4. All other response values have been coded to 
0. 
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Figure 5: Opposition to Immigration by Natives’ Views on Job Competition and Skill Level 
The purpose of including this variable is to incorporate the Labor Market Competition 
model of immigration policy attitude formation into my analysis. Figure 5 reveals a clear and 
potentially drastic difference in attitudes toward immigration between respondents who believe 
that immigrants increase competition for jobs and those who do not. By controlling for the skill 
level of the respondents, some confirmation of the effect described by the labor market 
competition model is evident. 
Perception of Welfare State Burden 
The final key independent variable, and the second of the two socioeconomic variables, 
that I will test is respondents’ perception that immigration results in a greater burden on the 
welfare state. Perception of Welfare State Burden (Take Welfare?) is measured based on 
responses to the survey question, “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They 
also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out 
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more than they put in or put in more than they take out?” Again, responses to this question were 
recorded as thermometer data which I have recoded as a dichotomous variable where values of 1 
indicate the sentiment that immigrants generally take out more than they put into the welfare 
state. All other responses have been coded to 0. 
 
Figure 6: Opposition to Immigration by Natives’ Perception of Welfare Use and Skill Level 
The inclusion of this variable reflects the Fiscal Burden model of immigration attitude 
formation. Rather than measuring opposition to immigration by controlling for the hypothetical 
skill level of newly arriving immigrants (which the available data does not allow), Figure 6 
illustrates natives’ opposition to immigration based on whether the respondent views immigrants 
as takers or contributors to the welfare state overall. Unsurprisingly, one can see that more 
natives who view immigrants as overall takers from the welfare state oppose immigration versus 
those who think that immigrants contribute to the welfare state overall. Again, respondents’ 
higher skill level reduces the effect of the variable on opposition to immigration. 
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4.2 Control Variables 
Skill Level 
Skill Level is a critical variable in both socioeconomic models addressed in this paper. As 
in the above figures, I will use a dichotomous variable for skill level in the following analysis 
based on educational attainment. Individuals who have attained a bachelor’s degree (or 
equivalent) or higher are coded as “high skill” (1) for the Skill Level variable. Those whose 
highest attained level of education is less than a bachelor’s degree are coded as “low skill” (0). A 
direct comparison of skill level and opposition to immigration shows that high-skill natives are 
less likely to oppose immigration than low-skill natives. A high-skill level also appears to reduce 
the effect of prejudice on opposition to immigration, as seen in Figure 4, as high-skill natives 
who indicated prejudicial views are nearly half as likely to oppose immigration as those with a 
low-skill level. 
Age 
Age is another important control variable discussed in the background literature and 
earlier studies. When considering socio-cultural factors which influence attitudes toward 
immigration, there is an expectation that younger respondents are likely to exhibit more 
cosmopolitan attitudes of ethnic and racial tolerance. Age is coded as interval-level data in this 
study. 
Household Income 
I have included a variable measuring income to test for effects of socioeconomic status 
on attitudes toward immigration. The ESS codes household income (Income Decile) as an 
ordinal variable by income decile. Cross-tabulating prejudice by household income does imply a 
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negative correlation, however I will show that the relationship mostly dissipates when the other 
variables are accounted for. 
Feelings About Household Income 
Previous studies often hint that peoples’ feelings about economic indicators can be much 
more telling than the indicators themselves. A household may hold a great deal of wealth or 
benefit from a good income, but what really matters with regards to attitude formation is the 
feeling that one has a good income. This analysis will measure feelings about household income 
(Income Feelings) based on responses to the question “"Which of the descriptions on this card 
comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?" A response of 
“Finding it very difficult on present income” is coded 4, “Finding it difficult on present income” 
is coded 3, “Coping on present income” is coded 2, and “Living comfortably on present income” 
is coded 1. Other responses have been omitted. 
4.3 Results 
Based on the variables I described, I have constructed five linear regression models 
(Error! Reference source not found.) testing, in particular, the effects of prejudice on attitudes 
toward immigration as well as comparing the effects of other cultural variables with the effects 
of the economic variables, all of which are proximate to the dependent variable. None of the 
models reveals surprising relationships between the independent variables and opposition to 
immigration. The most telling insights of the models, rather, are the relative strength or weakness 
of the effect each variable has on opposition to immigration. 
Model 1 first tests all of the variables (save for feelings about household income, which I 
will revisit). Overall, the model accounts for more than 51% of the variation in peoples’ attitudes 
toward immigration. The effect of racial or ethnic prejudice on attitudes was weaker than 
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expected, and it is tempered slightly further by the inclusion of my control variables, but it is 
nevertheless significant. Skill level of the respondent also has a somewhat negative minor effect 
on the dependent variable. Age has a slight impact on harming attitudes toward immigration, and 
household income boosts support very slightly. However, the largest effects by far come from 
respondent’s perceptions of immigration’s cultural and economic impacts. 
To further isolate the effects of individuals’ views on the cultural and economic effects of 
immigration, models 2 and 3 test each pair of variables separately. Each test all of the variables 
included in Model 1 with 2 removed: Model 2 removes the cultural variables while Model 3 
omits the variables related to immigration’s perceived economic impacts. Strikingly, the adjusted 
R-square value for Model 2 is less than half that of the first model while the adjusted R-square 
for Model 3 is reduced only slightly to 0.48, suggesting that the cultural variables tested here 
have a much greater impact on individuals’ attitudes toward immigration than the economic 
variables. In particular, respondents’ views about immigrants’ impact on their country’s cultural 
life has a strong impact.  
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Table 2: Linear Regression Models of Attitudes Toward Immigration 
 
 
On the other hand, Model 4 shows that the relative impact of racial or ethnic prejudice on 
immigration attitudes seems to be far less important. After removing prejudice from the 
regression model, we are still able to account for 51.5% of the variation in attitudes, which is not 
significantly different from Model 1 which does include prejudice, suggesting that while 
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prejudicial views alone do account for some of the effect on opposition to immigration, the effect 
is small. In Model 5, I substitute household income with feelings about household income to 
little effect, although feelings about income do appear to be a slightly more effective indicator 
than a more direct measure of income. 
There are two ways one might interpret the strong effect of Take Jobs? and Take 
Welfare? relative to prejudice. One is that these variables serve to indicate respondents’ 
perception about the type of immigration primarily taking place in their country. Those who 
believe that immigration represents a net increase on the labor market or a net drain on welfare 
may also believe that most new immigrants to their country are low-skill workers. The Labor 
Market Competition and Fiscal Burden Models predict that skill level should have a strong 
influence on opposition to immigration according to immigrant’s skill level, so if this 
interpretation is correct, we might expect skill level to have a strong effect in the models.  
An alternate explanation is that these two variables are measuring, to some extent, 
prejudicial views rather than economic perceptions. More so than natives’ understanding of the 
effects of immigration on the economy, they may measure natives’ expectations about the quality 
of the typical immigrant. We might speculate, then, that natives who believe that most 
immigrants take away more than they pay into the welfare system may base this belief not on 
objective knowledge but instead on assumptions which stem from underlying biases. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
An important takeaway from the analysis of the main theories explaining individual 
attitudes toward immigration is that we can only best understand how attitudes are forms on the 
whole by considering a broad array of economic and cultural factors together. Due to the 
complex interplay of these factors and the challenges associated with measuring them primarily 
from survey data, it would be exceedingly challenging to construct a robust and reliable general 
model to explain attitude formation toward immigration. I would stress that it was not the 
purpose of this study to create the groundwork for such a model, rather to better understand the 
relationship between economic and cultural factors as they pertain to effecting public opinion. I 
also set out to demonstrate that these theoretical perspectives, while often presented as 
competing, are not mutually exclusive to one another. 
Special attention should be paid to a prevailing theme of the creation of ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’ as a result of globalist policies which appeared frequently in the literature. It is along this 
dimension which opposition or support for immigration is especially defined, and so it is here 
that practical application for the research is most clear. Policymakers seeking to promote 
immigration must seek to balance that goal with the needs of native individuals, taking care to 
minimize the numbers of both economic and cultural ‘losers’ of any policy. Looking back to 
Figure 1, of the 6 populations most supportive of immigration polled in this ESS, 4 reside in 
Nordic countries. It is not difficult to speculate what effects the comprehensive Scandinavian 
social support system may have on reducing economic losers as well as cultural losers of 
immigration by aiding new immigrants to culturally assimilate. 
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Anecdotally speaking, the economic impacts of immigration hardly seem to receive too 
little attention. However, my analysis supports that cultural factors are perhaps even more 
important to address than economic factors by any policymakers hoping to boost popular support 
for immigration.  
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Appendix A: Support for immigration over feelings about cultural impact of immigration 
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